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Risk in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is often understood in terms of intertemporal choices,
i.e., preference for immediate outcomes in favor of delayed outcomes is considered
risky decision making. According to behavioral economics, healthy decision makers are
expected to refrain from choosing the short-sighted immediate gain because, over time
(10 trials of the IGT), the immediate gains result in a long term loss (net loss). Instead
decision makers are expected to maximize their gains by choosing options that, over
time (10 trials), result in delayed or long term gains (net gain). However, task choices
are sometimes made on the basis of the frequency of reward and punishment such that
frequent rewards/infrequent punishments are favored over infrequent rewards/frequent
punishments. The presence of these two attributes (intertemporality and frequency of
reward) in IGT decision making may correspond to the emotion-cognition dichotomy and
reflect a dual conception of risk. Decision making on the basis of the two attributes
was tested under two conditions: delay in retest and sleep deprivation. An interaction
between sleep deprivation and time delay was expected to attenuate the difference
between the two attributes. Participants were 40 male university students. Analysis of
the effects of IGT attribute type (intertemporal vs. frequency of reinforcement), sleep
deprivation (sleep deprivation vs. no sleep deprivation), and test-retest gap (short vs. long
delay) showed a significant within-subjects effect of IGT attribute type thus confirming
the difference between the two attributes. Sleep deprivation had no effect on the
attributes, but test-retest gap and the three-way interaction between attribute type,
test-retest gap, and sleep deprivation were significantly different. Post-hoc tests revealed
that sleep deprivation and short test-retest gap attenuated the difference between
the two attributes. Furthermore, the results showed an expected trend of increase in
intertemporal decision making at retest suggesting that intertemporal decision making
benefited from repeated task exposure. The present findings add to understanding of the
emotion-cognition dichotomy. Further, they show an important time-dependent effect of a
universally experienced constraint (sleep deprivation) on decision making. It is concluded
that risky decision making in the IGT is contingent on the attribute under consideration and
is affected by factors such as time elapsed and constraint experienced before the retest.
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INTRODUCTION
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994) is used to
test a hypothesis about emotion and decision making called the
somatic marker hypothesis (SMH; Damasio, 1994). The main
assumption in the SMH–IGT framework is that risk is perceived
in terms of its intertemporal attribute, i.e., choice of immedi-
ate as opposed to delayed reward and punishment is considered
risky (Bechara et al., 2005). However, IGT task choices also differ
on the basis of the frequency of immediate rewards and punish-
ments; thus, task choices differ in two ways. To clarify, the IGT
offers a choice among four decks of cards, labeled A′, B′, C′, and
D′. Unlike the original paper-and-pencil based task (ABCD), the
computerized task (A′B′C′D′) has increased delayed punishment
and therefore it amplifies the effect of disadvantageous choices
(see Bechara et al., 2000 for differences between the two variants).
Unbeknown to the decision maker, decks A′ and B′ have high
immediate rewards (100 points per card-pick) with 50% of cards
drawn from deck A′ giving a loss of 35–100 points and 10% of
cards drawn from deck B′ giving a loss of 1250 points, such that
10 cards drawn from decks A′ and B′ result in a net loss of 250
points. Decks C′ and D′ have small immediate rewards (50 points
per card-pick) with 50% of cards drawn from deck C′ giving a
loss of 25–75 points and 10% of cards drawn from deck D′ giv-
ing a loss of 250 points, such that 10 cards drawn from decks C′
and D′ result in a net gain of 250 points. Therefore the four decks
differ in two ways: (a) net outcome across time (i.e., inter tem-
poral attribute) by which decks A′ and B′ could be considered
risky in the long term, whereas decks C′ and D′ could be consid-
ered safe in the long term, and (b) frequency of immediate reward
and punishment notwithstanding net or long-term outcomes
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(i.e., frequency attribute) by which decks A′ and C′ could be per-
ceived as risky due to frequent punishments/infrequent rewards
and decks B′ and D′ could be perceived as safe due to infrequent
punishments/frequent rewards.
It is commonly understood that risk perception and decision
making in the IGT is governed by the intertemporal attribute
(Bechara et al., 2005), and that choices on the basis of the fre-
quency attribute have no long-term advantage (Dunn et al.,
2006). Nevertheless, there have been many observations of deci-
sion making on the basis of the frequency attribute (Wilder et al.,
1998; Ritter et al., 2004; Bark et al., 2005; Fishbein et al., 2005;
Shurman et al., 2005; Toplak et al., 2005; van den Bos et al., 2006).
This preference is incompatible with the SMH–IGT framework as
demonstrated, for example, by the finding that deck B′ was con-
sidered “risky” on the basis of the intertemporal attribute and is
preferred to other “safe” decks (Lin et al., 2007), whereas deck
C′ that was considered “safe” is avoided by healthy participants
(Chiu and Lin, 2007). Furthermore, dispositional risk seekers
who were assessed using a modified risk-taking scale (Domain-
Specific Risk-Taking; Weber et al., 2002) preferred decks A′ and
C′ and avoided decks B′ and D′ (Singh and Khan, 2008). Together,
these findings suggest that, in the IGT, risk might be perceived in
two ways, either by the intertemporal attribute or by frequency of
reward and punishment.
This dual conception of risk in the form of two attributes
(intertemporality and frequency) represents an important
dichotomy of cognition-emotion in IGT decision making.
Support for this dichotomy comes from dual process theories of
reasoning according to which there are two systems that process
information differently. One system is automatic, emotion-based,
and concerned with the present, whereas the second is reflec-
tive, cognition-based, and concerned with the future (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1971). Decision making on the basis of the
intertemporal attribute in the IGT reflects explicit learning (Maia
and McClelland, 2004), is dependent on hippocampus-mediated
memory systems such as the declarative memory system (Gupta
et al., 2009), engages working memory (Hinson et al., 2002), and
requires cognitive processing (Stocco et al., 2009). However, deci-
sion making on the basis of the frequency attribute is attributed
to automatic processing (Wilder et al., 1998; Stocco et al., 2009).
These findings suggest that decision making on the basis of the
intertemporal attribute is the result of activity in the cognition-
based system whereas decision making on the basis of the fre-
quency attribute may reflect activity in the emotion-based system.
Indeed, Stocco et al. (2009) found a double dissociation in deci-
sion making on the basis of the two attributes (intertemporality
and frequency). These researchers tested the role of cognitive
resources first by introducing a secondary task during learning
of the deck payoffs, and second, by restricting display of the out-
come, that is, by restricting access to information about the deck
payoffs. Contrary to their expectation, absence of a secondary
task (working memory load) was associated with greater decision
making on the basis of the frequency attribute. Thus, absence of
a secondary task, assumed to benefit the cognition-based system,
instead appeared to benefit the emotion-based system.
Unlike previous research, the present study was aimed at
differentiating decision making on the basis of the two attributes
(intertemporality and frequency) by manipulating re-test gap and
sleep deprivation, factors known to influence decision making on
the IGT. The dual process theory suggests that task-familiarity
(e.g., at retest) is conducive to activity of cognition-based system
(rather than to activity of emotion-based system). Accordingly,
decision making on the basis of the intertemporal attribute is
observed to improve at retest (i.e., preference for safe long-
term advantageous decks increases at retest) (Bechara et al.,
2000); this supports the contention that intertemporal deci-
sion making is cognition-based. However, it is unclear whether
task-familiarity at the retest reduces the reliance on emotion-
based system and results in a decrease in decision making
on the basis of the frequency attribute (i.e., preference for
infrequent punishment—frequent rewards decks decreases at
retest).
Furthermore, the difference between the two attributes should
be attenuated by two factors: (1) time delay, i.e., test-retest gap,
and (2) sleep deprivation. For example, it has been observed that a
lengthy (1 month) test-retest gap strengthens intertemporal deci-
sion making much more (i.e., greater increase in choices made
from the long-term advantageous decks) (Bechara et al., 2000)
than a shorter (1 week) test-retest gap (Turnbull and Evans, 2006)
suggesting that task familiarity offered by a retest and a long
test-retest gap and benefits intertemporal attribute. The present
study investigates the interaction between attribute type and the
test-retest gap. Few studies have investigated the effects of sleep
deprivation on the IGT (e.g., Killgore et al., 2006, 2007), how-
ever none have compared decision making on the basis of both
the attributes. Sleep deprivation impairs performance on tasks
that rely on the explicit memory system (Drosopoulos et al., 2005;
Fischer et al., 2006), it is the same system that governs intertem-
poral decision making in the IGT (Maia and McClelland, 2004).
Although decision making is often analyzed only on the basis of
intertemporality (i.e., the cognition-based system) (e.g., Killgore
et al., 2006, 2007), the impairment caused by sleep deprivation
has been explained as a failure of integration of both cognitive and
affective processes (Killgore et al., 2007). This makes it essential to
understand the effects of sleep deprivation on both attributes of
decision making in the IGT.
A few studies have investigated the combined effects of sleep
deprivation and test-retest gap on the IGT (e.g., Killgore et al.,
2006, 2007) however, none have compared decision making on
the basis of both attributes. Killgore et al. (2006) found that a
short (1 day) test-retest gap, when combined with sleep depri-
vation, impaired decision making and increased risky choices in
the IGT (greater number of choices made from the short-term
advantageous decks). At least one animal study has shown that
sleep deprivation and a short test-retest gap disrupt learning of
a hippocampus-dependent task, whereas sleep deprivation fails
to cause a disruption with a longer delay (Graves et al., 2003)
suggesting that the effects of sleep deprivation might be time-
dependent. As pointed out earlier, intertemporal decision making
is dependent on hippocampus-mediatedmemory systems (Gupta
et al., 2009), therefore, it was expected that a long test-retest gap
would reduce sleep deprivation impairments on the IGT in the
case of the intertemporal attribute. Overall, for the intertemporal
attribute, a short test-retest gap and sleep deprivation is expected
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to inhibit performance whereas a long test-retest gap is expected
to counteract (at least partially) the negative effects of sleep depri-
vation. Thus, the present study was focused on the interaction
between sleep deprivation and test-retest gap and it was expected
that this interaction would attenuate the difference between the
two attributes (intertemporality and frequency).
The research aims of the present study were to compare the
two attributes (intertemporality and frequency of immediate
reinforcement) when conditions were varied along two dimen-
sions, test-retest gap and sleep deprivation. It was hypothesized
that decision making would differ across the type of attribute
(intertemporal/frequency of reinforcement); it was expected
that sleep deprivation (sleep deprived/not sleep deprived) and
test-retest gap (short/long delay) would affect the two attributes
differently. A three-way interaction between attribute type,
sleep deprivation condition, and test-retest gap was expected.
Specifically, advantageous intertemporal decision making (i.e.,
net scores calculated on the basis of intertemporal attribute) was
expected to decrease under conditions of sleep deprivation and
short test-retest gap.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SAMPLE
Forty healthy, non-smoking, right-handed, Indian male students
volunteered for the study (Mean age = 24.92 years; SD = 1.99).
Even though the use of caffeine does not reverse sleep depri-
vation impairments in intertemporal decision making (Killgore
et al., 2007), self-reported consumption of tea/coffee greater
than 4–5 cups per day was an exclusion criterion. An all-male
sample was employed because gender plays a critical role in sleep-
deprivation-related risk behavior (Acheson et al., 2007) and in
IGT decision making (Tranel et al., 2005). In addition, female
students were reluctant to stay overnight (a condition of test-
ing) due to the sociocultural environment (gender roles) of the
country where the research was conducted (i.e., India). All par-
ticipating students were enrolled in a PhD program in either
the Department of Biosciences and Bioengineering (90%) or the
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences (10%). The stu-
dents were told that the study aimed to understand decision
making and would require them to be available for two sessions.
No incentives (money or course credit) were offered because
these could produce each participant’s superficially “best” task
performance rather than mimic real or natural task performance.
DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
A 2 × 2 × 2 mixed repeated-measures design was employed with
scoring type (intertemporal; frequency of reinforcement), sleep
deprivation (sleep deprived; not sleep deprived), and test-retest
gap (short; long) as factors. The analysis was repeated on the first
factor. The variables were the difference between total net IGT
scores at retest (T2) and baseline (T1) sessions, (1) scored accord-
ing to the intertemporal attribute [T2 ((C′ + D′) − (A′ + B′)) −
T1 ((C′ +D′)− (A′ + B′))] and (2) scored according to frequency
of preference for immediate reinforcement [T2((B′ + D′) − (A′
+ C′)) – T1((B′ + D′) − (A′ + C′))].
In the present study, the difference between total net IGT
scores at test (T1) and retest (T2) is considered. This differs
from previous studies where decision making was analyzed using
block-wise scores at retest (T2). Such studies have either used an
alternate version of the IGT at retest (Killgore et al., 2006), or have
changed the deck payoffs at retest (Turnbull and Evans, 2006) to
maintain uncertainty in decisionmaking at retest. This method of
analyzing block-wise performance is appropriate for comparing
participants’ rates of learning across trials because the initial tri-
als of the IGT (even at baseline) are considered to involve decision
making under uncertainty, whereas latter trials are considered
to involve decision making under risk or known payoffs (Brand
et al., 2007). However, the present study aimed to test decision
making under risk (i.e., under knowledge of payoffs) rather than
under uncertainty (i.e., under none/partial knowledge of payoffs).
Therefore, it was deemed acceptable to utilize a consistent vari-
ant of the IGT with the same deck payoffs throughout the entire
study. Furthermore, in a sleep deprivation study, Killgore et al.
(2006) used a within-subjects design, that is, participants served
as their own controls, a design that did not require accounting
for differences between the participants at the baseline, making it
appropriate to analyze decision making only at retest. However,
the present study used a mixed design therefore it was essential to
take into account differences in performance at baseline (T1) and
retest (T2) for all participants.
MATERIALS
A computerized version of the IGT (A′B′C′D′) and task instruc-
tions were presented on a computer screen. There were 60 cards
in a deck, and the exclusion criterion was exhausting any of the
four decks at either Time 1 (T1) or at Time 2 (T2); none of the
participants exhausted a deck. In the present study, deck pay offs
matched those used by Bechara et al. (2000) such that the task
amplified the negative consequences of selecting disadvantageous
decks.
PROCEDURE
Participants filled in a questionnaire giving their demographic
information. They were then presented with an overview of the
experiment, and gave informed consent. Participants were also
informed that their participation was voluntary, and that they
could drop out of the experiment at any stage. The study received
the approval of three committees comprising interdisciplinary
experts: (1) a thesis committee (Research Progress Committee),
(2) a departmental committee, and (3) an institute-level commit-
tee for the post-graduate research program (competent authority
for giving clearance for conducting research on human partici-
pants). Participants were then randomly assigned to one of four
groups (short-test-retest gap/sleep deprivation, long test-retest
gap/sleep deprivation, short test-retest gap/no sleep deprivation,
or long test-re-test delay/no sleep deprivation). Each participant
was tested to measure baseline IGT decision making (T1 con-
sisted of 100 trials). The two groups with short test-retest gaps
were retested (T2 consisted of 100 trials) 24 h after the baseline
session. However, the two groups with long test-retest gap were
retested 12 weeks after the baseline session. Participants in the
sleep-deprivation conditions were retested after one night of sleep
deprivation and participants in the no-sleep-deprivation con-
ditions were retested after a single restful night of sleep. Sleep
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deprivation introduced immediately after baseline (T1) and a
long test-retest gap would have allowed investigation of post-
task learning and consolidation; however the focus of the present
experiment was on comparing decision making on the basis of
the two attributes (intertemporality and frequency) based on
the presence (or absence) of sleep deprivation and the length of
test-retest gap.
All participants spent the night before the retest session in
a dormitory in the presence of a male research assistant who
observed no tossing and turning or other discomfort among
the participants as they slept. The environment matched that of
dormitories that are a regular feature of student life in the engi-
neering institutes in India. The dormitory had furniture (beds,
tables, chairs, side-tables, ceiling fans), lighting (tube lights),
and computers, and was maintained at a temperature similar to
the students’ own rooms. Participants in the sleep-deprivation
group were allowed to read books or magazines, watch movies,
or complete college assignments while in the dormitory room.
Participants in the sleep-deprivation group were in the com-
pany of a male research assistant and refrained from drinking
caffeinated beverages (e.g., tea, coffee) throughout the night.
Participants in the no–sleep-deprivation group were asked to
sleep (in presence of a male research assistant who observed no
discomfort among participants, and who woke participants in
time for the retest session). All participants were discouraged
from taking afternoon naps the day before the retest and were
reminded not to discuss the study with others. All IGT testing
was done between 7:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., and in each retest half
of participants were sleep-deprived and half were not. Baseline
and retest times were matched for all participants; for example, if
a participant underwent the baseline session at 8.00 a.m., his or
her retest session was also at 8.00 a.m.
RESULTS
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the IGT decision-making
scores, calculated in two ways (intertemporality and frequency)
for the four groups. Larger standard deviations (suggesting
greater variability) have been observed for intertemporal decision
making in the IGT (Bowman and Turnbull, 2003; Newman et al.,
2008) and were also observed in the present study.
There was a significant main effect of attribute type, F(1, 36) =
7.51, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.17. The was a significant interaction
effect between attribute type and test-retest gap, F(1, 36) = 5.01,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.12. There was also a significant three-way inter-
action among attribute type, sleep deprivation, and test-retest
gap, F(1, 36) = 5.16, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.12. The results showed a
difference between the total net scores calculated on the basis of
two different conceptualizations of risk in IGT—one based on the
intertemporal nature of reward and punishment and the other
based on preference for a specific frequency of immediate reward
and punishment. The test-retest gap interacted with attribute
type suggesting that risk taking (as understood according to the
two different attributes) is differentially susceptible to time delay
between the two exposures to the IGT. Contrary to expectations,
sleep deprivation did not have an effect on IGT decision making
analyzed via the two attributes. However, the three-way interac-
tion between sleep deprivation, time delay, and attribute type was
significant.
To further investigate the role of the test-retest gap, the three-
way interaction (attribute type × time delay × sleep depriva-
tion) was further probed with a repeated measures ANOVA on
the data that was split according to the short and long test-
retest gaps. For the short test-retest gap, the effect of attribute
type was not significant, but the interaction between sleep
deprivation and attribute type was significant, F(1, 18) = 4.55,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.20. In contrast, for the long test-retest gap,
there was a significant effect of attribute type, F(1, 18) = 9.61,
p < 0.01, η2p = 0.35, whereas the interaction of sleep depri-
vation with attribute type was not significant. These results
suggest that the difference between the two attributes is unaf-
fected by a short test-retest gap, but that sleep deprivation
introduced with a short test-retest gap attenuates the differ-
ence between the two attributes. Conversely, the difference
between the two attributes is affected by a long test-retest
gap, but the difference between the two attributes is unaffected
by introducing sleep deprivation with a long test-retest gap.
Figures 1, 2 depict the time-dependent effects (short vs. long
test-retest gap, respectively) of sleep deprivation on the two
attributes.
To test whether there was a difference between decision mak-
ing at retest (T2) and at baseline (T1) for the two attributes
(i.e., to test whether decision making at T2 was different from
that at T1), a paired t-test was done for total net scores derived
via the two attributes. There was a significant improvement
Table 1 | Groupwise differences between total net IGT scores at retest and baseline (T2 – T1), calculated according to the intertemporality and
frequency attributes (n = 40).
Scoring/attribute type Groups
Long time/Sleep dep. Short time/Sleep dep. Long time/No sleep dep. Short time/No sleep dep.
Intertemporal attribute
[(C′ + D′) − (A′ + B′)]
28.30 (40.22) −17.40 (17.61) 20.50 (27.83) 10.60 (19.10)
Frequency of reinforcement attribute
[(B′ + D′) − (A′ + C′)]
−14.80 (21.99) −04.80 (19.65) 01.70 (35.13) −07.80 (20.94)
Note: Values given are means (standard deviations). Long time/Sleep dep., Long test-retest gap, sleep deprivation; Short time/Sleep dep., Short test-retest gap,
sleep deprivation; Long time/No sleep dep., Long test-retest gap, no sleep deprivation; Short time/No sleep dep., Short test-retest gap, no sleep deprivation.
Frontiers in Psychology | Decision Neuroscience September 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 628 | 4
Singh Sleep deprivation/Iowa Gambling Task
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
No -SD SD
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 IG
T
 n
et
 sc
or
es
 (T
2-
T
1)
Difference in net IGT scores by attribute 
and SD group under short delay to retest
Intertemporal
[(C+D) - (A+B)]
Frequency of 
reinforcement
[(B+D) - (A+C)] 
FIGURE 1 | IGT scores for a short (24h) test-retest gap. Mean difference
between retest (T2) and baseline (T1) total net IGT scores (100 trials per
session) analyzed via the two attributes (intertemporal attribute and
frequency of reinforcement attribute) for the no-sleep-deprivation (No-SD)
and sleep-deprivation (SD) conditions. Error bars indicate standard error of
the mean.
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FIGURE 2 | IGT scores for a long (12 weeks) test-retest gap. Mean
difference between retest (T2) and baseline (T1) total net IGT scores (100
trials per session) analyzed via the two attributes (intertemporal attribute
and frequency of reinforcement attribute) for the no-sleep-deprivation
(No-SD) and sleep-deprivation (SD) conditions. Error bars indicate standard
error of the mean.
in total net IGT scores between baseline (M = 12.53, SD =
33.05) and retest (M = 24.38, SD = 24.09) when scored on the
basis of intertemporal attribute [i.e., (C + D) – (A + C)],
t(39) = −2.32, p < 0.05. However, when total net IGT scores
were calculated according to preference for immediate rein-
forcement, they showed a slight decline from baseline (M =
18.58, SD = 19.38) to retest (M = 11.95, SD = 26.12); how-
ever, this difference was not significant (Figure 3). As expected,
the results suggested that, overall, performance on the basis of
the intertemporal attribute increased with an increase in task
exposure.
DISCUSSION
The present study tested dual conception of risk in the IGT
as manifested by two decision making attributes (intertemporal
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FIGURE 3 | Total net IGT scores at baseline and retest calculated using
two methods of scoring risky decision making. The intertemporal
attribute shows a strengthening of preference for delayed outcomes at
retest whereas the frequency attribute does not. Error bars indicate
standard error of the mean.
attribute and frequency of reward and punishment). As expected,
The ANOVA showed a difference between the two total net IGT
scores derived from the two attribute types (intertemporality and
frequency). Thus, the data support the hypothesis that there is a
distinction between the two conceptualizations of risk in the IGT
indicating that decision making of cognition-based system differs
from that of emotion-based system at the retest.
As expected, differences in the two attributes were affected
by the length of test-retest gap suggesting that temporal stability
in risk taking is contingent both on the attribute under consid-
eration and on the time gap between test and retest. Contrary
to expectations, sleep deprivation had no independent effect on
the two attributes. This could be, in part, because rewards and
punishments are present in both attribute types, and because
sleep deprivation alters risk differentially for reward and pun-
ishment (McKenna et al., 2007; Venkatraman et al., 2007). For
instance, decision making on the basis of frequency of rein-
forcement (i.e., cards drawn from decks B′ and D′) is thought
to reflect a preference for frequent rewards rather than for
infrequent punishments (Wilder et al., 1998; Lin et al., 2007).
Decision making in the IGT is believed to be complex in nature
IGT (Upton et al., 2011). For instance, when sleep depriva-
tion induces risk-taking (intertemporal risk) and such risk-taking
is tested via the IGT, the mitigating effects of caffeine cannot
be observed (Killgore et al., 2007). However, when risk-taking
was tested via another task, called the Ballon Analog Risk Task
(BART), caffeine was found to restore risk taking (in sleep-
deprived individuals) to baseline level (Killgore et al., 2008).
Killgore et al. attribute this difference in the mitigating effects of
stimulants to the fact that the IGT has a “gain” frame whereas
the BART has a “loss” frame Killgore et al. (2008). In fact, it
is believed that risk perception in the IGT may further differ
between the domains of reward and punishment (Levin et al.,
2012).
In support of a hypothesized distinction between the
attributes, sleep deprivation in conjunction with the test-retest
gap had a significant effect on the two attributes. This suggests
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that the length of a test-retest gap plays a crucial role in how
sleep deprivation affects risky decision making when conceptu-
alized in two different ways. Follow-up analysis showed that a
short test-retest gap did not affect the two attributes differentially,
but that introducing sleep deprivation with a short test-retest
gap enhanced the difference between the two attributes. On the
other hand, a long test-retest gap did affect the two attributes dif-
ferentially and introducing sleep deprivation after a long delay
did not have any differential effect on the two attributes. These
results are consistent with those of Killgore et al. (2006, 2007) in
which sleep deprivation and short test-retest gaps (49, 51, 72 h)
impaired intertemporal decision making. It is possible that the
combination of a short test-retest gap and sleep deprivation cre-
ates fatigue which promotes dichotomizing of the two attributes.
This explanation is aligned with that given by Killgore et al., in
which fatigue due to sleep deprivation Killgore et al. (2007) or due
to even a modest self-reported decrease in sleep duration Killgore
et al. (2012) is believed to contribute to a failure of cognition-
emotion integration. In other words, fatigue might contribute to
differentiation of cognition and the emotion-based system. Even
though the present study did not test post-task consolidation, it
is possible that the effect of sleep deprivation is time dependent
for the widely used intertemporal attribute in the IGT. The cur-
rent results imply that temporal stability of the two attributes is
different and that learning of the two attributes might be dif-
ferentially vulnerable to the effects of test-retest gap and sleep
deprivation.
As expected, repeated task exposure (by retest) appeared to
be conducive to activity of cognition-based system. At retest,
there was a marked increase in choices made on the basis of the
intertemporal attribute. In the IGT, the intertemporal attribute
embodies a common conception of risk; that is, risk is consid-
ered as an anticipated tradeoff between immediate and delayed
outcomes. On the other hand, choices made on the basis of
the frequency-of-reinforcement attribute suggest that risk per-
ception in the IGT may be automatic and reflect spontaneous
processing of the frequency of rewards and punishments (Stocco
et al., 2009). In line with dual process theory (e.g., Evans, 2003;
Kahneman and Frederick, 2007), the frequency attribute may
be the “default attribute” and decision making on the basis of
the intertemporal attribute may require inhibition or overrid-
ing of this “default” mode. For example, in the present study,
it is possible that repeated task exposure at retest overrode the
response of the emotion-based system while at the same time
strengthening intertemporal decision making. This dual concep-
tion of risk in the IGT is aligned with the behavioral decision-
making literature that considers risk as “anticipated as well as
anticipatory” and “a deliberate as well as instinctive process”
(Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2004, 2005; Slovic and
Peters, 2006).
Consistent with the findings of Kahneman and Frederick
(2007), the present results indicate that two distinct types of
reasoning and rationality are manifested in IGT decision mak-
ing. Could the conceptualization of risk and rationality advanced
by the SMH–IGT framework—that is, risk as an intertempo-
ral choice and rationality as making long term advantageous
decisions—be a reflection of the environment where the task
was developed and the cognitive demands of that environ-
ment? Decision making in the IGT is observed to be gov-
erned by frequency of reinforcement rather than the intertem-
poral attribute in several cultural contexts including Taiwan
(Chiu and Lin, 2007; Lin et al., 2007; Chiu et al., 2008),
Iran (Ekhtiari et al., 2009), Brazil (Schneider et al., 2010),
and India (Singh and Khan, 2008). Future studies could uti-
lize the IGT to understand cultural variations in risk percep-
tion and risk taking at the behavioral as well as the neural
level.
Apart from the small sample size and the use of an all-male
sample, the present study had other limitations, such as the
lack of physiological monitoring to ascertain the effects of sleep
deprivation and a lack of accounting for individual disposition
(Franken and Muris, 2005) and mood (Suhr and Tsanadis, 2007).
One disadvantage of varying the test-retest gap (short and long
test-retest gap) is the inability to equate the affective and motiva-
tional states of the two groups between the two testing sessions.
Importantly, studying the effects of both, sleep and test-retest
gap on the IGT decision-making task will require weighing the
advantages and disadvantages of the research paradigm utilized
(Pace-Schott et al., 2011). For example decision making without
reward (as in the present IGT study) has the advantage of ensuring
that performance does not depend on incentives that compen-
sate for the effects of sleep deprivation and that performance is
not bolstered by reward incentives; a lack of incentive can be
disadvantageous in that it may be difficult to make inferences
about motivation in a decision making task where no incentive
is provided. However, at least one study has shown that there is
no difference in IGT decision making based on whether incen-
tives are real (monetary) or facsimiles (Bowman and Turnbull,
2003).
CONCLUSION
The present results contribute to current understanding of
IGT decision making related to two important attributes, the
intertemporal attribute and the frequency of reinforcement
attribute. The results also add to knowledge concerning the larger
question of the dichotomy between cognition and emotion in
decision making. For instance it might be possible that failure
to incorporate the cognition and emotion dichotomy is respon-
sible for the instability that is observed in risky decision making
(Fox and Tannenbaum, 2011; Vlaev, 2011). Apart from point-
ing out that stability in risk taking in the IGT is contingent
on the attribute under consideration, the current results also
suggest that inconsistency in risk taking (across a time span)
observed in decision making tasks could be due to factors (such
as time elapsed and constraint) affecting dichotomization of the
emotion-cognition processes.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The study was completed in partial fulfillment of the require-
ments for a doctoral degree at the Indian Institute of Technology–
Bombay. I thank Naveen Kashyap for assistance with data
collection.
Frontiers in Psychology | Decision Neuroscience September 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 628 | 6
Singh Sleep deprivation/Iowa Gambling Task
REFERENCES
Acheson, A., Richards, J. B., and
de Wit, H. (2007). Effects of
sleep deprivation on impulsive
behaviors in men and women.
Physiol. Behav. 91, 579–587. doi:
10.1016/j.physbeh.2007.03.020
Bark, R., Dieckmann, S., Bogerts, B.,
and Northoff, G. (2005). Deficit
in decision making in catatonic
schizophrenia: an exploratory study.
Psychiatry Res. 134, 131–141. doi:
10.1016/j.psychres.2004.04.013
Bechara, A., Damasio, A., Damasio,
H., and Anderson, S. (1994).
Insensitivity to future consequences
following damage to human
prefrontal cortex. Cognition 50,
7–15. doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(94)
90018-3
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., and
Damasio, A. R. (2000). Emotion,
decision-making and the
orbitofrontal cortex. Cereb. Cortex
10, 295–307. doi: 10.1093/cercor/
10.3.295
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel,
D., and Damasio, A. R. (2005).
The Iowa Gambling Task and
the somatic marker hypothesis:
some questions and answers.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 9, 159–162. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2005.02.002
Bowman, C. H., and Turnbull, O.
H. (2003). Real versus facsimile
reinforcers on the Iowa Gambling
Task. Brain Cogn. 53, 207–210. doi:
10.1016/S0278-2626(03)00111-8
Brand, M., Recknor, E. C.,
Grabenhorst, F., and Bechara,
A. (2007). Decisions under ambi-
guity and decisions under risk:
correlations with executive func-
tions and comparisons of two
different gambling tasks with
implicit and explicit rules. J. Clin.
Exp. Neuropsychol. 29, 86–99. doi:
10.1080/13803390500507196
Chiu, Y. C., and Lin, C. H. (2007). Is
deck C an advantageous deck in the
Iowa Gambling Task? Behav. Brain
Funct. 3, 37–48. doi: 10.1186/1744-
9081-3-37
Chiu, Y. C., Lin, C. H., Huang, J. T.,
Lin, S., Lee, P. L., and Hsieh, J. C.
(2008). Immediate gain is long-term
loss: are there foresighted decision
makers in the Iowa Gambling Task?
Behav. Brain Funct. 4, 13–23. doi:
10.1186/1744-9081-4-13
Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes’
Error: Emotion, Reason, and
the Human Brain. London:
Papermac/Macmillan.
Drosopoulos, S., Wagner, U., and Born,
J. (2005). Sleep enhances explicit
recollection in recognition mem-
ory. Learn. Mem. 12, 44–51. doi:
10.1101/lm.83805
Dunn, B., Dalgleish, T., and Lawrence,
A. (2006). The somatic marker
hypothesis: a critical review.
Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 30,
239–271. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.
2005.07.001
Ekhtiari, H., Behzadi, A., Dehghani,
M., Jannati, A., and Mokri, A.
(2009). Prefer a cash slap in your
face over credit for halva. Judg.
Decis. Making 4, 534–542.
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2003). In two minds:
dual process accounts of reasoning.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 454–459. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2003.08.012
Fischer, S., Drosopoulos, S., Tsen,
J., and Born, J. (2006). Implicit
learning-explicit knowing: a role for
sleep in memory system interaction.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 18, 311–319. doi:
10.1162/089892906775990598
Fishbein, D. H., Eldreth, D. L., Hyde,
C., Matochik, J. A., London, E.
D., Contoreggi, C., et al. (2005).
Risky decision making and the
anterior cingulate cortex in absti-
nent drug abusers and nonusers.
Cogn. Brain Res. 23, 119–136. doi:
10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2004.12.010
Fox, C. R., and Tannenbaum, D. (2011).
The elusive search for stable risk
preferences. Front. Psychol. 2:298.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00298
Franken, I. H. A., and Muris,
P. (2005). Individual differ-
ences in decision making. Pers.
Indiv. Differ. 39, 991–998. doi:
10.1016/j.paid.2005.04.004
Graves, L. A., Heller, E. A., Pack, A.
I., and Abel, T. (2003). Sleep depri-
vation selectively impairs mem-
ory consolidation for contextual
fear conditioning. Learn. Mem. 10,
168–176. doi: 10.1101/lm.48803
Gupta, R., Duff, M. C., Denburg, N.
L., Cohen, N. J., Bechara, A., and
Tranel, D. (2009). Declarative
memory is critical for sus-
tained advantageous complex
decision-making. Neuropsychologia
47, 1686–1693. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuropsychologia.2009.02.007
Hinson, J., Jameson, T., and Whitney,
P. (2002). Somatic markers, work-
ing memory, and decision mak-
ing. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci.
2, 341–353. doi: 10.3758/CABN.2.
4.341
Kahneman,D., and Frederick, S. (2007).
Frames and brains: elicitation and
control of response tendencies.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 11, 45–46. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.007
Killgore, W., Balkin, T., and Wesensten,
N. (2006). Impaired decision
making following 49 h of sleep
deprivation. J. Sleep Res. 15, 7–13.
doi: 10.1111/j.1365-2869.2006.
00487.x
Killgore, W., Grugle, N., Killgore, D.,
Leavitt, B., Watlington, G., McNair,
S., et al. (2008). Restoration
of risk-propensity during sleep
deprivation: caffeine, dextroam-
phetamine and modafinil. Aviat.
Space Environ. Med. 79, 867–874.
doi: 10.3357/ASEM.2259.2008
Killgore, W., Lipizzi, E., Kamimori,
G., and Balkin, T. (2007). Caffeine
effects on risky decision-making
after 75 hours of sleep depriva-
tion. Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 78,
957–962. doi: 10.3357/ASEM.2106.
2007
Killgore, W., Schwab, Z., and Weiner,
M. (2012). Self-reported nocturnal
sleep duration is associated next-day
resting state functional connectiv-
ity. Neuroreport 23, 741–745. doi:
10.1097/WNR.0b013e3283565056
Levin, I. P., Xue, G., Weller, J. A.,
Reimann, M., Lauriola, M., and
Bechara, A. (2012). A neuropsycho-
logical approach to understanding
risk-taking for potential gains and
losses. Front. Neurosci. 6:15. doi:
10.3389/fnins.2012.00015
Lin, C., Chiu, Y., Lee, P., and Hsieh,
J. (2007). Is deck B a disadvanta-
geous deck in the Iowa Gambling
Task? Behav. Brain Funct. 3, 16–26.
doi: 10.1186/1744-9081-3-16
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee,
C. K., and Welch, N. (2001). Risk as
feelings. Psychol. Bull. 127, 267–286.
doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.127.2.267
Maia, T. V., and McClelland, J. L.
(2004). A reexamination of the
evidence for the somatic marker
hypothesis: what participants
really know in the Iowa gam-
bling task? Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U.S.A. 101, 16075–16080. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0406666101
McKenna, B. S., Dickinson, D. L., Orff,
H. J., and Drummond, S. P. A.
(2007). The effects of one night
of sleep deprivation on known-
risk and ambiguous-risk decisions.
J. Sleep Res. 16, 245–252. doi:
10.1111/j.1365-2869.2007.00591.x
Newman, L. I., Polk, T. A., and
Preston, S. D. (2008). “Revealing
individual differences in the Iowa
Gambling Task,” in Proceedings of
the 30th Annual Conference of the
Cognitive Science Society, eds B.
C. Love, K. McRae, and V. M.
Sloutsky (Austin, TX: Cognitive
Science Society), 1067–1072.
Pace-Schott, E., Nave, G., Morgan, A.,
and Spencer, R. M. C. (2011). Sleep-
dependent modulation of affectively
guided decision-making. J. Sleep
Res. 21, 30–39. doi: 10.1111/j.1365-
2869.2011.00921.x
Ritter, L., Meador-Woodruff, J., and
Dalack, G. (2004). Neurocognitive
measures of prefrontal cortical
dysfunction in schizophrenia.
Schizophr. Res. 68, 65–73. doi:
10.1016/S0920-9964(03)00086-0
Schneider, D., Denburg, N., Fonseca,
R. P., and Parente, M. A. (2010).
A cultural study on decision mak-
ing: performance differences on
the Iowa gambling task between
selected groups of Brazilians and
Americans. Psychol. Neurosci. 3,
101–107. doi: 10.3922/j.psns.2010.
1.013
Shurman, B., Horan, W. P., and
Nuechterlein, K. H. (2005).
Schizophrenia patients demon-
strate a distinctive pattern of
decision-making impairment on
the Iowa Gambling Task. Schizophr.
Res. 72, 215–224. doi: 10.1016/j.
schres.2004.03.020
Singh, V., and Khan, A. (2008).
Heterogeneity in choices on Iowa
Gambling Task: preference for
infrequent–high magnitude pun-
ishment. Mind Soc. 8, 43–57. doi:
10.1007/s11299-008-0050-1
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E.,
and MacGregor, D. G. (2004). Risk
as analysis and risk as feelings:
some thoughts about affect, rea-
son, risk, and rationality. Risk Anal.
24, 1–12. doi: 10.1111/j.0272-4332.
2004.00433.x
Slovic, P., and Peters, E. (2006). Risk
perception and affect. Curr. Dir.
Psychol. Sci. 15, 322–325. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-8721.2006.00461.x
Slovic, P., Peters, E., Finucane,
M. L., and MacGregor, D. G.
(2005). Affect, risk, and deci-
sion making. Health Psychol. 24,
S35–S40. doi: 10.1037/0278-6133.
24.4.S35
Stocco, A., Fum, D., and Napoli,
A. (2009). Dissociable processes
underlying decisions in the Iowa
Gambling Task: anew integrative
framework. Behav. Brain Funct. 5, 1.
doi: 10.1186/1744-9081-5-1
Suhr, J., and Tsanadis, J. (2007).
Affect and personality corre-
lates of the Iowa Gambling Task.
Pers. Indiv. Differ. 43, 27–36. doi:
10.1016/j.paid.2006.11.004
Toplak, M. E., Jain, U., and Tannock,
R. (2005). Executive and moti-
vational processes in adolescents
with attention-deficit-hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD). Behav. Brain
Funct. 1, 8–20. doi: 10.1186/1744-
9081-1-8
Tranel, D., Damasio, H., Denburg,
N. L., and Bechara, A. (2005).
Does gender play a role in func-
tional asymmetry of ventromedial
prefrontal cortex? Brain 128,
2872–2881. doi: 10.1093/brain/
awh643
www.frontiersin.org September 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 628 | 7
Singh Sleep deprivation/Iowa Gambling Task
Turnbull, O. H., and Evans, C. E.
Y. (2006). Preserved complex
emotion-based learning in amnesia.
Neuropsychologia 44, 300–306.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.
2005.04.019
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1971).
Belief in the law of small num-
bers. Psychol. Bull. 76, 105–110. doi:
10.1037/h0031322
Upton, D. J., Bishara, A. J., Ahn, W. Y.,
and Stout, J. C. (2011). Propensity
for risk taking and trait impul-
sivity in the Iowa Gambling Task.
Pers. Indiv. Differ. 50, 492–495. doi:
10.1016/j.paid.2010.11.013
van den Bos, R., Houx, B., and
Spruijt, B. (2006). The effect of
reward magnitude differences
on choosing disadvantageous
decks in the Iowa Gambling Task.
Biol. Psychol. 71, 155–161. doi:
10.1016/j.biopsycho.2005.05.003
Venkatraman, V., Chuah, Y. M. L.,
Huettel, S. H., and Chee, M. W.
L. (2007). Sleep deprivation elevates
expectation of gains and attenuates
response to losses following risky
decisions. Sleep 30, 603–609.
Vlaev, I. (2011). Inconsistency in
risk preferences: a psychophys-
ical anomaly. Front. Psychol.
2:304. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.
00304
Weber, E., Blais, A., and Betz, N. (2002).
A domain-specific risk-attitude
scale: measuring risk perceptions
and risk behaviors. J. Behav. Decis.
Making 15, 263–290. doi: 10.1002/
bdm.414
Wilder, K. E., Weinberger, D. R., and
Goldberg, T. E. (1998). Operant
conditioning and the orbitofrontal
cortex in schizophrenic patients:
unexpected evidence for intact
functioning. Schizophr. Res. 30,
169–174. doi: 10.1016/S0920-
9964(97)00135-7
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
author declares that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 30 April 2013; accepted:
25 August 2013; published online: 19
September 2013.
Citation: Singh V (2013) Dual concep-
tion of risk in the Iowa Gambling Task:
effects of sleep deprivation and test-retest
gap. Front. Psychol. 4:628. doi: 10.3389/
fpsyg.2013.00628
This article was submitted to Decision
Neuroscience, a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2013 Singh. This is an
open-access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other
forums is permitted, provided the origi-
nal author(s) or licensor are credited and
that the original publication in this jour-
nal is cited, in accordance with accepted
academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does
not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Decision Neuroscience September 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 628 | 8
